Abstract-In this work we consider the communication of information in the presence of a causal adversarial jammer. In the setting under study, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (x1, . . . , xn) bit-by-bit over a communication channel. The adversarial jammer can view the transmitted bits xi one at a time, and can change up to a p-fraction of them. However, the decisions of the jammer must be made in an online or causal manner. Namely, for each bit xi the jammer's decision on whether to corrupt it or not (and on how to change it) must depend only on xj for j ≤ i. This is in contrast to the "classical" adversarial jammer which may base its decisions on its complete knowledge of x. We present a non-trivial upper bound on the amount of information that can be communicated. We show that the achievable rate can be asymptotically no greater than min{1 − H(p), (1 − 4p) + }. Here H(.) is the binary entropy function, and (1 − 4p)
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following adversarial communication scenario. A sender Alice wishes to transmit a message u to a receiver Bob. To do so, Alice encodes u into a codeword x and transmits it over a binary channel. The codeword x = x 1 , . . . , x n is a binary vector of length n. However, Calvin, a malicious adversary, can observe x and corrupt up to a p-fraction of the n transmitted bits, i.e., pn bits.
The "classical" adversarial channel model considered in coding theory (e.g., [5] ) assumes that Calvin has full knowledge of the entire codeword x. Based on this knowledge (together with the knowledge of the code shared by Alice and Bob) Calvin can maliciously plan what error to impose on x. We refer to such an adversary as an omniscient adversary. For binary channels, the optimal rate of communication in the presence of an omniscient adversary has been an open problem in classical coding theory for several decades. The best known lower bound is given by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound [11] , [20] , which implies that Alice can transmit at rate 1 − H(2p) to Bob. Conversely, the tightest upper bound (MRRW bound) was given by McEliece et al. [14] , and has a positive gap from the lower bound for all p ∈ (0, 1/4) (see Fig. 1 ).
In this work we initiate the analysis of coding schemes that allow communication against certain adversaries that are 0 The work of M. Langberg was supported in part by ISF grant 480/08, the work of B. K. Dey was supported by Bharti Centre for Communication in IIT Bombay, and that of S. Jaggi was partially supported by grants from the CUHK MoE-Microsoft Key Laboratory of Human-centric Computing and Interface Technologies, and by CERG grant 412608. weaker than the omniscient adversary. We consider adversaries that behave in a causal or online manner. Namely, for each bit x i , we assume that Calvin decides whether to change it or not (and if so, how to change it) based on the bits x j , for j ≤ i alone, i.e., the bits that he has already observed. In this case we refer to Calvin as a causal adversary.
Causal adversaries arise naturally in practical settings, where adversaries typically have no a priori knowledge of Alice's message u. In such cases they must simultaneously learn u based on Alice's transmissions, and jam the corresponding codeword x accordingly. This causality assumption is reasonable for many communication channels, both wired and wireless, where Calvin is not co-located with Alice. For example consider the scenario in which the transmission of x = x 1 , . . . , x n is done during n channel uses over time, where at time i the bit x i is transmitted over the channel. Calvin can only corrupt a bit when it is transmitted (and thus its error is based on its view so far). To decode the transmitted message, Bob waits until all the bits have arrived.
As in the omniscient model, Calvin is restricted in the number of bits pn he can corrupt. This might be because of limited processing power or limited transmit energy.
Recently, the problem of codes against causal adversaries was considered and solved by the authors [7] for largeq channels, i.e., channels where Alice's codeword x = x 1 , . . . , x n is considered to be a vector of length n over a field of "large" size q. Each symbol x i may represent a large packet of bits in practice. Calvin is allowed to arbitrarily corrupt a p-fraction of the symbols, rather than bits. A tight characterization of the rate-region for various scenarios is given in [7] , and computationally efficient codes that achieve these rate-regions are presented. However, the techniques used in characterizing the rate-region of causal adversaries over large-q channels do not work over binary channels. This is because each symbol in a large-q channel can contain within it a "small" hash that can be used to verify the symbol. This is the crux of the technique used to achieve the lower bounds in [7] . We currently do not know how to extend this method to binary channels. Conversely, for upper bounds, the geometry of the space of length-n codewords over largeq alphabets is significantly different than that corresponding to binary alphabets. For instance, for large-q channels the volume of an n-sphere of radius αn (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) over F q is ∼ q nα , This leads to simpler bounds for large-q channels. In this work we initiate the study of binary causaladversary channels, and present two upper bounds on their capacity: 1 − H(p), and (1 − 4p)
+ . The upper bound of 1 − H(p) is very "natural". Namely, it is not hard to verify that if Calvin attacks Alice's transmission by simulating the well-studied Binary Symmetric Channel [5] , he can force a communication rate of no more than 1 − H(p). The upper bound of (1 − 4p)
+ presented in this work is non-trivial for both its implications and its proof techniques. The bound demonstrates that at least for some values of p, the achievable rate is bounded away from 1 − H(p). For p ∈ (p 0 , 0.5), 1 − 4p is strictly less than 1 − H(p) (here p 0 is the value of p satisfying H(p) = 4p, and can be computed to be approximately 0.15642 . . .). In fact for p ∈ (0.25, 0.5) our bound implies that no communication at positive rate is possible, which is much stronger than the result obtained by the upper bound of 1 − H(p) (see Fig. 1 ). Our proof techniques include a combination of tools from the fields of Extremal Combinatorics (e.g. Turán's theorem [19] ), and classical Coding Theory (e.g. the Plotkin bound [16] , [3] ).
II. MODEL
For any integer i let [i] denote the set {1, . . . , i}. Let R ≥ 0 be Alice's rate. An (n, Rn)-code C is defined by Alice's encoder and Bob's corresponding decoder, as below. Alice: Alice's message u is assumed to be a random variable U with entropy Rn, over alphabet U. We consider two types of encoding schemes for Alice. For deterministic codes, Alice's message U is assumed to be uniformly distributed over
n . Alice's codebook X is the collection {x(u)} of all possible transmitted codewords.
More generally, Alice and Bob may use probabilistic codes (also known as stochastic encoders). For such codes, the random variable U corresponding to Alice's message p U may have an arbitrary distribution p U (with entropy Rn) over an arbitrary alphabet U . Alice's codebook X is an arbitrary collection {X (u)} of subsets of {0, 1}
n . For each subset X (u) ⊂ X , there is a corresponding codeword random variable X(u) with codeword distribution p X(u) over X (u). For any value U = u of the message, Alice's encoder choses a codeword from X (u) randomly according to the distribution p X(u) . Alice's message distribution p U , codebook X , and all the codebook distributions p X(u) are all known to both Bob and Calvin, but the values of the random variables U and X(.) are unknown to them. If X (u) = {x(u, r) : r ∈ Λ} (Λ is the set of possible random keys used by the encoder), then the transmitted codeword X(U) has the probability distribution given by
Calvin/Channel: Calvin possesses n jamming functions g i (.) and n arbitrary jamming random variables J i that satisfy the following constraints. Causality constraint: For each i ∈ [n], the jamming function
Power constraint: The number of indices i ∈ [n] for which the value of g i (.) equals 1 is at most pn. That is, for all
The output of the channel is the set of bits
n to the messages in U. Code parameters: Bob is said to make a decoding error if the message u ′ he decodes differs from the message u encoded by Alice. The probability of error for a given message u is defined as the probability, over Alice, Calvin and Bob's random variables, that Bob makes a decoding error. The probability of error of the code C is defined as the average over all u ∈ U of the probability of error for message u.
We define two types of rates and corresponding capacities. The rate R is said to be weakly achievable if for every ε > 0, δ > 0 and every sufficiently large n there exists an (n, (R − δ)n)-code that allows communication with probability of error at most ε. The supremum over n of the weakly achievable rates is called the weak capacity and is denoted by C w . The rate R is said to be strongly achievable if for every δ > 0, ∃α > 0 so that for sufficiently large n there exists an (n, (R − δ)n)-code that allows communication with probability of error at most e −αn . The supremum over n of the strongly achievable rates is called the strong capacity and is denoted by C s . The relevance of this definition will be seen in Theorem 2 where we show that rates above min{1 − H(p), (1 − 4p) + } are not strongly achievable even with probabilistic encoders. The study of strong achievability is motivated by the extensive literature on error exponents in information theory -for large classes of information-theoretic problems, e.g. [10] , [6] , the probability of error of the coding scheme indeed decays exponentially in block length. Remark: Since a rate that is strongly achievable is always weakly achievable but the converse is not true in general, we have C w ≥ C s .
III. RELATED WORK AND OUR RESULTS
To the best of our knowledge, communication in the presence of a causal adversary has not been explicitly addressed in the literature (other than our prior work for causal adversaries over large-q channels). Nevertheless, we note that the model of causal channels, being a natural one, has been "on the table" for several decades and the analysis of the online/causal channel model appears as an open question in the book of Csiszár and Korner [6] (in the section addressing Arbitrary Varying Channels [2] ). One crucial difference between many prior models and the causal adversarial model considered here is the absence of shared randomness between the encoder and the decoder in our model. Various variants of causal adversaries have been addressed in the past, for instance [1] , [2] , [12] , [17] , [18] , [15] -however the models considered therein differ significantly from ours.
At a high level, we show that for causal adversaries, for a large range of p (for all p > 0.25), the maximum achievable rate equals that of the classical "omniscient" adversarial model (i.e., 0). This may at first come as a surprise, as the online adversary is weaker than the omniscient one, and hence one may suspect that it allows a higher rate of communication.
We have two main results. Theorem 1 gives an upper bound on the weak capacity C w if Alice's encoder is deterministic. Theorem 2 gives an upper bound on the strong capacity C s in the more general case where Alice's encoder is probabilistic. Due to certain limitations of our proof techniques, our bounds in the latter setting hold for strong capacity only. The upper bound in both cases equals
Due to space limitations we omit the detailed proof of Theorem 2 here. We instead provide a high-level description of it's proof in Section III-A, and refer the interested reader to [13] .
A. Outline of proof techniques
The upper bound of 1 − H(p) (even for C w using probabilistic codes) follows directly by describing an attack for Calvin wherein he approximately simulates a BSC(p) (Binary Symmetric Channel [5] with crossover probability p). More precisely, for each i ∈ [n] and any sufficiently small ε > 0, Calvin flips x i with probability p − ε until he runs out of his budget of pn bit-flips. By the Chernoff bound [4] , with very high probability he does not run out of his budget, and is therefore indistinguishable from a BSC(p − ε). But it is wellknown [5] that in this case the optimal rate of communication from Alice to Bob is 1 − H(p − ε). Taking the limit when ε → 0 implies our bound.
The upper bound of (1 − 4p) + is more involved. For the case where Alice's encoder is deterministic, the proof of Theorem 1 has the following overall structure. Assume for sake of contradiction that Alice attempts to communicate at rate greater than R = (1 − 4p) + . To prove our upper bound we design the following wait-and-push attack for Calvin.
Calvin starts by waiting for Alice to transmit approximately Rn bits. As Alice is assumed to communicate at rate greater than R, the set of Alice's codewords X ′ consistent with the bits Calvin has seen so far is "large" with "high probability". Calvin constructs X ′ and chooses a codeword x ′ uniformly at random from X ′ . He then actively "pushes" x in the direction of x ′ by flipping, with probability 1/2, each future x i that differs from x ′ i . If Calvin succeeds in pushing x to a word y roughly midway between x and x ′ , a careful analysis demonstrates that regardless of Bob's decoding strategy, Bob is unable to determine whether Alice transmitted x or x ′ -causing a decoding error of 1/2 in this case. So, to prove our bound, we must show that with constant probability (independent of the block length n) Calvin will indeed succeed in pushing x to y. Namely, that Alice's codeword x and the codeword chosen at random by Calvin x ′ are of distance at most 2pn. Roughly speaking, we prove the above by a detailed analysis of the distance structure of the set of codewords in any code using tools from extremal combinatorics and coding theory.
The case where Alice's encoder may be randomized is more technically challenging, and is considered in Theorem 2. At a high level, the strategy of Calvin for a probabilistic encoder follows that outlined for the deterministic case. However, there are two main difficulties in its extended analysis. Firstly, the symmetry between x and x ′ no longer exists. Namely, the fact that Bob may not be able to distinguish which of the two were transmitted by Alice does not necessarily cause a significant decoding error, since the probability of x ′ being transmitted by Alice may well be significantly smaller than the probability that x was transmitted. Secondly, the fact that both x and x ′ may correspond to the same message u places the entire scheme in jeopardy. As it now no longer matters if Bob decodes to x or x ′ , in both cases the decoded message will be that sent by Alice.
To overcome these difficulties, we describe a more intricate analysis of Calvin's attack. Roughly speaking, we prove that a "large" subset X ′′ of X ′ behaves "well". Any x ′ chosen uniformly at random from X ′ , with "significant" probability, is in X ′′ , and has three properties corresponding to those when Alice uses a deterministic encoder. That is, x ′ is sufficiently close to x as desired, it has approximately the same probability of transmission that x does (thus preserving the needed symmetry), and it also corresponds to a message that differs from that corresponding to x. All in all, we show that the above three properties hold with probability 1/poly(n), which suffices to bound the strong capacity of the channel at hand (but not the weak capacity).
The proof of the upper bound corresponding to 1 − H(p) has already been sketched in Section III-A. Hence we only provide proof of the upper bound corresponding to (1−4p) + .
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 Let R = (1 − 4p) + + ε for some ε > 0. Let log(.) denote the binary logarithm, here and throughout. By assumption for deterministic codes, Alice's message space U is of size 2
Rn . Here we assume for that 2
Rn in an integer. This implies that the set X of Alice's transmitted codewords is of size 2
Rn . 1 We now present Calvin's attack. We show that for any fixed ε > 0, regardless of Bob's decoding strategy, there is a decoding error with constant probability (namely, the error probability is independent of n). Calvin's attack is in two stages. First Calvin passively waits until Alice transmits ℓ = (R − ε/2)n bits over the channel. Let x ℓ ∈ {0, 1} ℓ be the value of the codeword observed so far. He then considers the set of codewords that are consistent with the observed x ℓ . Namely, Calvin constructs the set X | x ℓ = {x = x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X | x 1 , . . . , x ℓ = x ℓ }. He then chooses an element x ′ ∈ X | x ℓ uniformly at random. In the second stage, Calvin follows a random bit-flip strategy. That is, for each remaining bit x ′ i of x ′ that differs from the corresponding bit x i of x transmitted, he flips the transmitted bit with probability 1/2, until he has either flipped pn bits, or until i = n.
We analyze Calvin's attack by a series of claims. We first show that with high probability (w.h.p.) the set X | x ℓ is large. Claim 4.1: With probability at least 1 − 2 −εn/4 , the set X | x ℓ is of size at least 2 εn/4 . Proof: The number of messages u for which X | x ℓ (u) is of size less than 2 εn/4 is at most the number of distinct prefixes x ℓ times 2 εn/4 , which in turn is at most 2 ℓ+εn/4 = 2 (R−ε/4)n . Now assume that the message u is such that its corresponding set X | x ℓ (u) is of size at least 2 εn/4 . We now show that this implies that the transmitted codeword x and the codeword x ′ chosen by Calvin are distinct and of small Hamming distance apart with a positive probability (independent of n).
Claim 4.2:
Conditioned on Claim 4.1, with probability at least
Consider the undirected graph G = (V, E) in which the vertex set V consists of the set X | x ℓ and two nodes are connected by an edge if their Hamming distance is less than d = 2pn − εn/8. An independent set I in G corresponds to a subset of codewords in {0, 1}
n that are all (pairwise) at distance greater than d.
Since the codewords in X | x ℓ all have the same prefix x ℓ , one may consider only the suffix (of length n − ℓ = 4pn − 1 In fact, X may be smaller, however we note that for codes of optimal rate, |X | is of size exactly 2 Rn . If |X | < 2 Rn , then for some transmitted codeword x at least two messages u and u ′ must both be encoded to x. On receiving x, Bob's probability of error is maximal -it is at least 1/2. Therefore changing the codebook so as to encode u ′ as some x ′ / ∈ X cannot increase the probability of decoding error.
εn/2) of the codewords in X | x ℓ . Here we assume p ≤ 0.25, minor modifications in the proof are needed for larger p. The set of vectors defined by the suffixes in an independent set I of G now corresponds to a binary error-correcting code of length 4pn − εn/2, with |I| codewords and minimum distance d. By Plotkin's bound [3] and the condition of Claim 4.2 there do not exist binary error correcting codes with more than 2d 2d−(4pn−εn/2) + 1 codewords. Thus I, any maximal independent set in G, must satisfy
By Turán's theorem [19] , any undirected graph G of size |V| and average degree ∆ has an independent set of size at least |V|/(∆ + 1). This, along with (1) implies that the average degree of our graph G satisfies
This in turn implies that
The second inequality is for large enough n, since |V| is of size at least 2 ǫn/4 . To summarize the above discussion, we have shown that our graph G has large average degree of size ∆ ≥ ε|V | 32p . We now analyze Calvin's attack. By the definition of deterministic codes, any codeword in X is transmitted with equal probability. Also, by definition both x (the transmitted codeword) and x ′ (the codeword chosen by Calvin) are in V = X | x ℓ . Hence both x and x ′ are uniform in X | x ℓ . This implies that with probability at least |E|/|V| 2 the nodes corresponding to codewords x and x ′ are distinct and connected by an edge in G. This in turn implies that with probability |E|/|V| 2 , x = x ′ and d H (x, x ′ ) < 2pn − εn/8, as required. Now
Conditioned on Claim 4.2, Calvin's codeword x ′ is very close to Alice's transmitted codeword x. Specifically, d H (x, x ′ ) ∈ (0, 2pn − εn/8). We now show that if Calvin follows the random bit-flip strategy, from Bob's perspective (w.h.p.), both x or x ′ were equally likely to have been transmitted by Alice.
We first show that during Calvin's random bit-flip process, w.h.p., Calvin does not "run out" of his budget of pn bit flips. Claim 4.3: Conditioned on Claim 4.2, with probability at
Proof: The expected number of locations flipped by Calvin is d/2 ≤ pn− εn/16. Assume that d/2 = pn− εn/16 (for smaller values of d the bound is only tighter). By Sanov's theorem [5, Theorem 12.4.1] , the probability that the number of bits flipped by Calvin deviates from the expectation d/2 by more than εn/16 is at most e
large enough n. It should be noted that d/2 + εn/16 ≤ pn, and so d H (x, y) ≤ d/2 + εn/16 implies that the number of bits flipped by Calvin does not exceed pn. Since Calvin possibly flips only the bits of x which differ from the corresponding bits in x ′ , (2) also implies
We conclude by proving that if the number of bits flipped by Calvin lies in the range (d/2 − εn/16, d/2 + εn/16), then indeed Bob cannot distinguish between the case in which x or x ′ were transmitted. Claim 4.4: Conditioned on Claim 4.3 Bob makes a decoding error with probability at least 1/2.
Proof: By Bayes' Theorem [9] , if Bob receives y, the a posteri probability that Alice transmitted x, denoted p(x|y), equals p(y|x)p(x)/p(y). Here p(x) is the probability (over her encoding strategy) that Alice transmits x, p(y|x) is the probability (over Calvin's random bit-flipping strategy) that Bob receives y given that Alice transmits x, and p(y) is the resulting probability that Bob receives y. Similarly,
Taking the ratio and noting that for deterministic codes p(x) = p(x ′ ), we have
Since Calvin's random bit-flip strategy involves him flipping bits of x (which are different from the corresponding bits of x ′ ) with probability 1/2, for all y satisfying (2), the probabilities p(y|x) and p(y|x ′ ) are equal. This observation and (4) together imply p(x|y) = p(x ′ |y). Thus, Bob cannot distinguish whether x or x ′ were transmitted. Namely, on the pair of events in which Alice transmits x and Calvin chooses x ′ and in which Alice transmits x ′ and Calvin chooses x, Bob's average decoding error is at least 1/2 regardless of decoding process. This proves our assertion.
The 
V. CONCLUSIONS
We analyze the capacity of the causal-adversarial channel and show (for both deterministic and probabilistic encoders) that the capacity is bounded by above by min{1−H(p), (1− 4p) + }. For a large range of p (for all p > 0.25), the maximum achievable rate equals that of the stronger classical "omniscient" adversarial model (i.e., 0).
Several questions remain open. In this work we do not address achievability results (i.e., the construction of codes).
It would be very interesting to obtain codes for the causaladversary channel which obtain rates greater than those known for the "omniscient" adversarial model (i.e., the Gilbert-Varshamov bound) for p < 0.25). As we do not believe that the bound of (1 − 4p) + presented in this work is actually tight, such codes, if they exist, may hint at the correct capacity.
As in our work on large alphabets [7] , one may also consider a more general channel model in which for a delay parameter d ∈ (0, 1), the jammer's decision on the corruption of x i must depend solely on x j for j ≤ i−dn. This might correspond to the scenario in which the error transmission of the adversarial jammer is delayed due to certain computational tasks that the adversary needs to perform. The capacity in this scenario is an intriguing problem left open in this work.
